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Students of American civil liberties inevitably confront what
historian Thomas Haskell has called “the curious persistence of rights talk
in the age of interpretation.”  Haskell’s dilemma is to explain the
persistence and growth of the modern civil liberties movement in precisely
the post-World War II decades in which skepticism about the truth value of
rights claims spread widely among American public intellectuals.1  In fact,
the problem is even more acute than this.  A civil liberties tradition as
twenty-first-century American lawyers understand it – a body of legal
protections for liberties such as speech and assembly – barely existed in the
United States before intellectuals and political reformers of a variety of
different perspectives began to challenge the characteristic hallmarks of
nineteenth-century liberalism.  The civil liberties movement in American
law – even the use of the phrase “civil liberties” itself – arose in precisely
the years in and around World War I in which pragmatic skepticism about
the status of rights claims grew strongest.  Moreover, early architects of the
civil liberties movement were themselves leading skeptics and even
founders of modernist legal institutions that sought to consign rights talk to
a nineteenth-century past.
One prominent solution to the paradox connects the advent of civil
liberties to the rise of the distinctively American philosophical tradition of
pragmatism and its jurisprudential analogues.  Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes famously observed in 1919 that pragmatic uncertainty as to ultimate
truths ought to lead nation-states to be reluctant to prohibit the expression
of even apparently abhorrent ideas.  “Time,” Holmes wrote in his dissent in
United States v. Abrams, “has upset many fighting faiths,” and it followed
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for Holmes that nation-states should establish protections for speech and
expression that we would today call civil liberties.2  Yet until Holmes’s
suggestion in 1919, pragmatism had consistently cut against rights claims.
John Dewey scorned those who at the opening of World War I clung to “the
individualistic tradition” of “early Victorian platitudes” about “the sanctity
of individual rights.”3  Critics pointed out that the problem of uncertainty
to which Holmes pointed in Abrams cut both ways, calling into question not
only legislative commitments to the suppression of particular ideas, but also
the unyielding commitment to principle that underlay civil liberties claims
in crisis times.4  And indeed, as American intervention in World War I
approached, lawyers like Raymond Fosdick (soon to become the first
Undersecretary General of the League of Nations) increasingly saw
“‘natural rights’” along with “Jefferson and laissez-faire” as just so many
“mental trappings” from “a century ago.”5  As Ernest Hemingway would
write, the war had called into question the power of “abstract words such as
glory, honor, courage, or hallow” – and, we might add, liberty and rights.6
A second account of the civil liberties paradox sees in World War
I what political scientist Samuel Huntington would call a moment of
“creedal passion”: a confrontation between the nation and its deepest
values.7  Federal legislation effectively criminalized antiwar speech; the
Post Office barred antiwar and radical literature from the mails; mobs
brutalized and even lynched anti-war speakers; and federal agents and allied
vigilantes led lawless raids on labor unions and radical organizations.
Events such as these, the second account contends, touched off a movement
on behalf of ideas about rights that Americans had long held but had long
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taken for granted.8  Yet there is remarkably little evidence for a long-
standing American civil liberties tradition in nineteenth-century America.
As one historian has put it, the nation’s civil liberties record instead “seems
terribly dismal.”9  The civil liberties violations of the World War One
period were not so different from those of the Civil War.  Indeed, as a
prominent opponent of antiwar speech noted in 1917, Lincoln’s “limitations
of free speech” provided a model for the Wilson administration a half
century later.10  Moreover, American law had long been characterized a
wide array of practices that by twenty-first-century standards would seem
clear violations of important civil liberties.  Southern states banned
antislavery literature and speech.  Congress stifled abolitionist petitions.
Congress and the states alike prohibited the dissemination of birth control,
sexual literature, and pornography.  Laws prohibited entertainment on
Sundays.  Courts broadly enjoined peaceful labor picketing.  And
communities participated in repressing the free speech efforts of
organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World.11  Indeed, historian
Henry Steele Commager plausibly wrote of the period between 1789 and
1937 that there had not been “a single case, in a century and a half, where
the Supreme Court has protected freedom of speech, press, assembly, or
petition against congressional attack.”12  Nineteenth-century American law,
in short, seems to have borne out James Madison’s warning that the
provisions of the Bill of Rights would be mere “parchment barriers” to acts
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of government repression.13
The development of civil liberties in and around World War I is
thus difficult to explain by reference to home-grown traditions.  Neither the
philosophical tradition of pragmatism, nor some supposed moment of truth
for Americans’ ostensibly deepest values provide powerful explanations of
the modern civil liberties movement.  
Instead, what stands out about the beginnings of our modern civil
liberties tradition is the way in which a legal and political movement that
transcended the national boundaries of the United States found fertile soil
in American law.  The domestic civil liberties movement has its roots in
pre-World War I cosmopolitanism in international law.  In the late
nineteenth century, internationalists had begun to question not just the
abstract metaphysical truth of rights claims but also the usefulness of that
other great abstraction of nineteenth-century law: the sovereignty of the
nation state.  The civil liberties movement in American law thus did indeed
emerge out of a pragmatist critique of abstract legal fictions.  The relevant
abstraction, however, was not so much the formal concept of rights as the
formal concept of state sovereignty.
This article describes the connections between the movement
contemporaries called “internationalism” and the beginnings of the
twentieth-century civil liberties tradition.  No one better captures these
connections than Crystal Eastman, an indefatigable and charismatic, though
now largely forgotten, young New York lawyer.  Between 1913 and 1917,
she became one of the most important figures in the early-twentieth-century
American internationalist movement.  And in 1917, she founded with Roger
Baldwin the predecessor organization to the American Civil Liberties
Union.  Yet a domestic civil liberties movement had not been Eastman’s
aim at all.  For Eastman and a like-minded group of transatlantic
internationalists, the world war occasioned a struggle for new supranational
legal structures to constrain the excesses of nation states that the war had so
plainly revealed.  When the patriotic obligations of wartime placed new
limits on internationalism, however, American internationalists like
Eastman turned to civil liberties as a means to constrain the nation state that
could ostensibly be located the American national tradition.  The irony is
that within a very short time, civil liberties claims swallowed up and
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obscured the internationalism out of which they had arisen. 
If the story told here is successful, a number of interesting points
about the international law and American civil liberties follow.   As I
suggested at the outset, the internationalist beginnings of American civil
liberties solves the paradox of civil liberties in the age of pragmatism.  And
as I indicate in Part II, it also helps to explain the exceptionally prominent
role of women in the American civil liberties movement.  Women like
Crystal Eastman were especially quick to recognize the dangers  posed by
nation-states in which they had long had only an attenuated form of
membership.  Nation states had barred women from voting and even
stripped them of their citizenship when, like Eastman in 1916, they married
foreign nationals.
Moreover, the internationalist beginnings of American civil liberties
help bring the civil liberties experience into line with contemporaneous
developments in American law and statecraft.  Historians and lawyers have
for almost three decades now been chipping away at the myths of American
exceptionalism in such areas of the law as tort, crime, labor, and the
constitution,14 and such areas of reform as urban planning, social insurance,
and even home economics.15  In these areas and elsewhere, we are learning,
American law and politics developed not in isolation but in robust trans-
oceanic conversations.16  The story of Eastman and of American
internationalism shows that even in that ostensibly most distinctively
American feature of our legal system – its emphasis on the civil liberties of
individuals – American law has inescapably been a product of interactions
and ideas on a global scale.  The American civil liberties movement in the
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twentieth century has not merely been a U.S. export to the world, though it
has been that.17  Civil liberties have instead been part of a kind of civil
libertarian import / export business, as ideas drawn from transatlantic and
European currents in international law have been fed back into circulation
as civil liberties claims.
The story of civil liberties and American internationalism holds
sobering lessons for those internationalists and civil libertarians in our own
time.  Much like the World War I moment almost a century ago, ours is an
era that once again pits the obligations of loyalty to the nation-state against
aspirations to an international rule of law.  Crystal Eastman would find that
the nation states of the world would vigorously and even violently defend
their prerogatives.  Much as Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations idea
would falter in the face of nationalism, Eastman would learn that the
authority of law was deeply and perhaps even inextricably connected to the
authority of the very nation states she sought to eclipse.  In the United
States, the result was a cosmopolitan prewar internationalism that – though
it had begun with the aim of transcending the nation state – soon came to
rely on a set of civil liberties claims that could be rooted in the constituent
documents of American nationalism.
I
Catherine Crystal Eastman hailed from the heart of the nineteenth-
century American reform tradition.  In the words of her brother, the eclectic
aesthete and radical editor Max Eastman, he and Crystal had grown up near
the “center of gravity” of the “moral and religious map of the United
States.”18  She was born in 1881 in Glenora, New York, not far from where
the Seneca Falls Convention had issued the Declaration of Sentiments in
1848 to mark the beginnings of the nineteenth-century woman’s movement.
Her mother, Annis Ford Eastman, attended Oberlin College, Ohio’s center
of abolitionist activism.  Her father, Samuel Eastman, served and was
wounded in the Civil War.  Both became congregational ministers in upstate
New York, where they eventually moved to the Park Church in Elmira, one
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of the nation’s leading churches.  In 1870, Mark Twain had married the
daughter of a prominent Elmira family at the Park Church.  The church’s
abolitionist pastor, Thomas Beecher, belonged to one of the most prominent
families in America.  His sister, Harriet Beecher Stowe, the author of Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, was (in words attributed to Abraham Lincoln) the “little
woman who wrote the book that started” the Civil War.  His brother, Henry
Ward Beecher, was (like their father, Lyman Beecher, before them)
America’s most influential preacher.  And in 1889, upon Thomas Beecher’s
death, Crystal’s parents jointly assumed the church pastorate that Beecher
had held for thirty-five years.19
In Elmira, Crystal and her brothers Max and Anstice grew up in a
home that embraced the tenets of nineteenth-century reform movements, the
woman’s movement principal among them.  At least in part at Crystal’s
insistence, the household “was run on feminist principles”; there was, as she
later explained, “no such thing in our family as boys’ work and girls’
work.”20  As a 15-year-old, Crystal had read a paper – “Woman” – at a
lakeside symposium on the woman’s movement organized by her mother.
And Crystal scandalized the community by refusing to sacrifice her
enthusiasms for the sake of community ideas about how girls ought to
behave, “wearing bathing suits without the customary stockings and skirts,”
in the words of her biographer, and refusing to ride horses sidesaddle. 21
Taking the woman’s movement’s goal of “woman’s rights” as her standard,
Eastman’s upbringing was organized around the importance of the rights of
individual, unencumbered by the happenstance of such things as gender.
As Annis told her children from early on, the ideal of the Eastman
household and of nineteenth-century American reform movements from
abolition and married women’s property laws to temperance was that each
human being “be an individual.”  “Nothing you can gain,” Annis warned
them, “will make up for the loss of yourself.”  The “conformity of the
crowd” was anathema where it involved the individual’s “sacrifice of
principle.”22 
8 Internationalism & Civil Liberties
23See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution (1975).
24See Joan D. Hedrick, Harriet Beecher Stowe: A Life (1994); 
25See Richard Wightman Fox, Trials of Intimacy: Love and Loss in the Beecher-Tilton
Scandal (1999);
26 Sylvia A. Law, “Crystal Eastman: Organizer for Women’s Rights, Peace, and Civil
Liberties in the 1910s,” 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 1305, 1310 (1994); 
27Eastman, Enjoyment of Living, 330.
28See Morton G. White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (1949);
Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science
Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (1977); James Kloppenberg, Uncertain
Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920 (1986);
Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (1991); 
By the late nineteenth century, however, the nineteenth-century
American reform tradition into which Crystal was born had begun to lose
its way.  The abolition of slavery had removed the tradition’s greatest
campaign, and although a few abolitionists turned to address the “wage
slavery” of northern capitalism, relatively little moral fervor coalesced
around such alternative forms of labor exploitation.23  In the Beecher family
alone, Harriet Beecher Stowe had moved from writing Uncle Tom’s Cabin
to running a Florida plantation worked by poorly-paid black agricultural
workers.24  Closer to Elmira, Henry Ward Beecher had been brought low by
the media spectacle of his apparent affair with the wife of a prominent
parishioner.25  To be sure, the woman’s movement that had begun at Seneca
Falls continued.  But the New Departure for women’s suffrage and political
equality that the leaders of the nineteenth-century Woman’s Movement had
pursued beginning in the 1870s had sputtered; despite a modest string of
successes in western states from 1887 to 1896, not a single state had
enfranchised women between 1896 and 1910.26  As Max would later remark
about Mark Twain, by the turn of the century old Elmira and the nineteenth-
century reform tradition seemed more and more like they “belonged to the
‘old regime.’”27
In the new century into which Crystal came of age, Americans were
beginning to grope toward new ways of articulating the relationships
between individuals and their communities – ways that sought to reject the
abstract rights claims and individualism of nineteenth-century liberalism in
favor of a historicized conception of society and politics as organic,
evolving, and deeply interdependent phenomena.28  After her graduation
from Vassar, Crystal plunged into the center of this new conversation about
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social politics in European and American thought.  With the encouragement
of her mother, Crystal entered Columbia University to pursue a graduate
degree in political economy beginning in the fall of 1903.  And although
Eastman would spend only a year at Columbia, while there she took two
courses each with the men who had made Columbia a center for the study
of new ideas in economics and sociology: John Bates Clark, pioneering
economist and co-founder of the iconoclastic American Economic
Association, and Franklin Henry Giddings, a leading sociologist.29  
Clark, like many other prominent late nineteenth-century American
economists, had done graduate work in economics in Germany in the 1870s,
where he developed a deep respect for socialist ideas that emphasized
cooperation over individualism.  The German school of historical
economics in which Clark studied argued that classical economists such as
Ricardo and Malthus had failed to account for the apparent growth of
poverty and inequality in industrializing economies.  As history veered
toward greater and greater interdependence, the German historicists argued,
the state would be required to take on wider and wider responsibilities in
economic life.  Clark quickly came to agree.  By the time he returned to the
United States, Clark was convinced of the “beauty” and “altruism” of “the
socialistic ideal” as against the selfish advancement of the strong over the
weak in individualism.  Over time, Clark would pull back from his
endorsement of socialist principles; by the time Eastman arrived at
Columbia, Clark had become better known for his groundbreaking ideas in
the field of marginalist economics.  But Clark remained a committed – if
moderate – progressive into the twentieth century.30
Giddings’s influence on Eastman appears to have been still more
important.  Giddings was a leader in the use of statistical techniques in the
study of society; as one scholar later put it, Giddings sought to make sense
of social phenomena “in terms of chance and probability.”31  As the holder
of the first chaired professorship in sociology in the United States, Giddings
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conceived his subject not as the study of individuals in isolation, but as the
study of individuals in the variety of collective groups in which they
inevitably found themselves.  Sociology was “the phenomena presented by
aggregations of living beings,” as Giddings put it in an article he drafted
while Eastman was enrolled in his classes, for aggregation was the constant
fact of social life.32  Society, in Giddings’s conception, was an
“organization for the promotion of . . . efficiency by means of
standardization and discipline,” a “norm” that functioned to control “the
variations from itself” such that individual behaviors would generally be
found “clustering” around it.33  Within the structures of “social pressure”
that constituted modern social life, eighteenth and nineteenth-century
individualism and natural rights ideas were simply beside the point.  “The
aggregation of human beings into communities” necessarily occasioned
“restrictions of liberty.”34  Indeed, individualism in the nineteenth-century
sense was little more than the “riotous” use of power by those who had it.35
Natural rights ideas, in turn, were mere “legal forms of freedom” that had
given rise to “conditions of great and increasing inequality.”36  To be sure,
Giddings was no socialist – “Utopian collectivism” was as distasteful to him
as individualism run amok.37  But a “third and middle view,” which
combined the cautious use of the state with reasonable competitive
freedoms, could ensure the proper mix of liberty and equality.  Ultimately,
the proportions of restraint and liberty that were “conducive to the general
welfare” turned on the “normal social constraint” in the community and the
“stage of its evolution” in history.38  This was the “supremely important
question in all issues of public policy,” and no doubt it would be difficult
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to discern in particular cases.39  What Giddings was certain of, however,
was that the instruments of the social policy maker were the insights of
sociology and statistics, not old nostrums about rights and individualism.40
Eastman may not have imagined that she would put Giddings’s
ideas to use so quickly.  In 1904, she left Columbia after what may either
have been a bad final examination experience or an encounter with
Giddings’s increasingly dim view of the place of women in public life.41
She decided instead to go into the law.  It was a bold decision for a woman
in 1904 and 1905.  Of all the major American professions, law was
probably the most unwelcoming to women.  In 1872, when the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld Illinois’s refusal to admit Myra Bradwell to the state
bar, Associate Justice Joseph P. Bradley explained that “nature herself” had
made women unfit to enter into the bar; their “paramount destiny and
mission” was service as wives and mothers.42  Although Bradwell was soon
admitted to practice in Illinois by a change in the state’s law, no women
were admitted to practice law in the Eastman’s home state of New York
until 1886.  By 1910, there were only 133 women among the 17,000
lawyers across the state, and only 558 women among the more than 114,000
lawyers nationwide.  Even as late as 1920, women would make up 5 percent
of all physicians and 4.7 percent of all scientists, but only 1.4 percent of all
lawyers in the country.43  
Columbia’s law school did not admit women, but the law school at
New York University did.  By the time Crystal enrolled there in 1905, New
York University had become the leading school for training women lawyers
in the United States.44  Crystal quickly became part of a close-knit circle of
early women lawyers with whom she just as quickly developed a deep
enthusiasm for the law.  “I am even more wild than before to be a lawyer,”
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she confided her brother.  By her second year of two at law school she had
emerged as one of the school’s leading students – the second vice-president
of the class, a champion of law school causes, and friend of everyone from
faculty members to the school janitor.45
For Eastman, as for so many woman lawyers in the twentieth-
century, success in law school did not translate into professional success
after graduation.  She sought out a law office where she could get “started
with a good practice.”  “My mind is just tingling to get to practicing law,”
she wrote to Max.46  In particular, she picked out the prosecution of
negligence cases and personal injury suits on behalf of plaintiffs as the
speciality she would like to pursue.  The field of employee injuries was
notoriously hostile to plaintiffs.  Injured employees faced a number of legal
hurdles to winning a case against their employers.  Relatively few
employees chose to sue, and practicing in the field offered little
remuneration and even less prestige.  Nonetheless, Eastman came to believe
that in such cases “a lawyer has every chance of winning before a jury if he
. . . knows the business.”47  Yet it turned out that she could not get work in
even a relatively low-prestige and poorly-paid area of the law such as
personal injury practice.  Her connections to a few reform-minded New
York lawyers like the prominent socialist Morris Hillquit and leading labor
lawyer George W. Alger failed to produce employment prospects.  In fact,
the refusal of male lawyers to practice with women effectively kept her out
of the profession altogether.  Crystal Eastman would never actually practice
law.48
Instead, after taking the bar exam in the summer of 1907, Eastman
went to Pittsburgh in the fall of 1907 to begin what was scheduled to be a
two-month investigation of industrial accidents and the law for the
Pittsburgh Survey, a survey of social conditions in the nation’s most
important industrial city.  Her friend Paul Kellogg, an editor and
progressive reformer with whom she had an ongoing flirtation, had hired
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her on to the project.49  And though her interest in practicing law initially
made her a reluctant participant, she soon began to turn with more and more
energy to the investigation of industrial accidents.  Here was work that
tapped both her legal training and her training in sociology.  “Strange to
say,” she noted to her mother, “my spirits thrive on all this atmosphere of
death and destruction.”  “Statistics,” it turned out, the “records of tragedies”
that she collected in the coroners’ office, were not so much depressing as
“interesting to me sociologically.”  Her two month engagement turned into
a full year, and she spent the first half of 1908 bringing Giddings’s
statistical empirics to the study of work accidents, tabulating hundreds of
injuries and fatalities into carefully presented tables documenting the human
wreckage of the steel mills, coal mines, and railroads of western
Pennsylvania.50
In fact, although Eastman seems to have had only the vaguest sense
of this when she began the Pittsburgh study, industrial accidents provided
an ideal field for bringing the new currents in sociological thought to bear
on the law.  When she arrived in Pittsburgh in the fall of 1907, the United
States was entering the fourth decade of an industrial accident problem like
none that had ever existed anywhere in the world.  The relative absence of
safety regulations in American industrial work, relatively expensive labor
and capital, and a law of employers’ liability that made employee injuries
relatively inexpensive for employers had combined to make American work
accident rates far greater than those of other industrializing nations.  And
by the first decade of the twentieth century, leading lawyers, politicians, and
muckraking journalists alike had begun to focus public attention on the
problem.51  
Critics of the law of employers’ liability, as the field was known,
argued that it was based in the nineteenth-century rights-based thinking that
sociologists like Giddings were now describing as antiquated at best.
Nineteenth-century jurists had sought to develop the law of torts as a kind
of applied discipline in liberal political theory that would uphold each
individual’s right to act as he pleased so long as he did not do harm to
14 Internationalism & Civil Liberties
52Witt, Accidental Republic, 43-70.
53See Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings.
others.  Employees could generally recover compensation from their
employers in work accident cases only if they could show that the employer
had acted outside the scope of its rightful sphere of action by injuring the
employee through some negligent or intentionally harmful act.  If the
employer had acted within its rights (or if the employee had acted outside
his rights by a negligent act of his own), the employee could not recover.
The employee’s tort case against the employer thus turned on an inquiry
into the relative rights and duties of the parties.  Yet such inquiries all too
often proved intractable.  For one thing, it was extraordinarily time-
consuming and costly to conduct trials into the nuances of the parties’
behavior.  Perhaps more troublingly, it seemed increasingly apparent that
a significant percentage of work accidents could not be traced to the fault
of anyone at all.  Even where no one seemed to have acted outside of their
rights, injuries occurred.  Such injuries were simply the inevitable fallout
from dangerous work, and whether or not they could be attributed to some
individual or institution’s fault, the existence of a grave social problem – the
destitution of thousands upon thousands of families each year – seemed
abundantly clear.52
Between 1908 and 1910, Eastman did as much as any American
lawyer to direct public discourse about work accidents away from tortured
inquiries into the rights and duties of employer and employee.  Beginning
in the 1880s, western European nations – first Germany, then England and
then France, had enacted workmen’s compensation statutes that sought to
eliminate questions of right and duty and to instead provide injured workers
with a kind of guaranteed insurance payment.53   Injured employees were
not made whole – that is, compensation levels sought merely to provide for
their needs, not to restore them to the status quo ante as if in response to a
violation of their rights.  But for Eastman as for Giddings before her, talk
of rights was largely a futile exercise.  Employee injuries were not so much
a problem of conflicting rights and duties as a problem of “national
economy.”   “Each year” turned out industrial injuries just “as surely as the
mills ran full and the railroads prospered.”  Yet the “American System” of
distributing accident costs “on the basis of old individualistic legal theory”
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made a “necessary national loss” into “an absolutely unnecessary amount
of national deprivation.”54  What was needed was nothing short of a
revolution in the way American law dealt with the problem, and the
statistical methods Eastman had learned in graduate school were (she
decided) “good stuff” with which to “start a revolution.”  Statistics would
establish that “justice between individuals” was a quixotic aim in the work
accident field.  All the law could do was to seek “a distribution of the loss
which shall be to the best interests of all concerned.”  Workmen’s
compensation statutes would vindicate the social interests that Eastman saw
as the proper aim of twentieth-century accident law.55
Eastman’s newfound prominence brought her to the attention of the
growing number of lawmakers interested in substituting workmen’s
compensation’s insurance system for tort law’s rights and duties.  “The
book of fame,” as she put it to Max, was unrolling for her.56  By late 1908
she was actively sought after for speaking engagements and articles on a
topic that was quickly moving to the forefront of the political agenda.  And
in June 1909, at the suggestion of one of her professors at Vassar, Governor
Charles Evans Hughes named her secretary to the Wainwright Commission,
appointed to investigate the problem of work accidents in the State of New
York and to recommend new legislation to address it.57  Completion of her
work on the Pittsburgh Study prevented Eastman from participating as fully
in the work of the Commission as she might have liked.  But her imprint on
the Commission’s influential report – significant portions of which were
allocated to her for drafting – was abundantly evident.58
Indeed, as the workmen’s compensation movement got underway,
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the nineteenth-century legal tradition of liberal, rights-based jurisprudence
came to seem a chief obstruction to efforts to rationalize the law of
workplace accidents.  Legislation purporting to regulate the employment
contract had all too often been struck down by courts as unconstitutional
interference with rights of contract and liberty.  As Eastman observed soon
after the commission’s proposed statute had gone into effect in the fall of
1910, provisions in the nation’s state and federal constitutions that had been
“originally intended . . . to safeguard the rights of the people” now served
instead “to deny the rights of the people.”59  In March 1911, nine months
after the New York workmen’s compensation law went into effect, the
state’s highest court struck the statute down as a violation of employers’
constitutional rights.  The rights tradition of American law had once again
obstructed the sociological rationalization of the law.60
For many, the decision of the New York court set off a search for
ways to accommodate workmen’s compensation statutes to the
constitutional rights of employers.  For Eastman, however, the court’s
decision marked the end of her involvement in sociological law reform.  It
had come at a difficult time for her.  Her mother, Annis, died of a stroke in
October.  In January, Eastman came down with one of the illnesses that
would plague her for the rest of her life, causing her to return home to
Elmira and break off her work with the Wainwright Commission.  To be
sure, she had fallen in love with a young man named Wallace Benedict,
who shared her interest in the insurance industry.  But already in early 1911
she was beginning to dread the impending move from the eclectic
excitement of New York to “Bennie’s” home town of Milwaukee.61  
Then in March, a day after the New York court struck down the
workmen’s compensation law on which she had labored, the infamous
Triangle Shirt-Waist Fire killed 146 people, many of them young women
working behind the locked doors and ill-secured fire escapes of the Triangle
Waist Company.62  The fire, she wrote Max, “sank into my soul,” giving
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rise to a “constant stirring sense of tragedy and horror.”  Combined with the
court decision of the previous day, the Triangle Fire seemed to raise starkly
the ways in which the social reform of American law had run headlong into
the institutions of the nineteenth-century state.  Eastman’s sociological
skepticism about rights and her progressive reform optimism about the
capacity of rationalized, sociologically-informed legal institutions now gave
way to a newly fiery radicalism.  “Benevolent talk about workingmen’s
insurance and compensation” might “appease our sense of right,” but after
events like the Triangle Fire, Eastman announced, “what we want is to start
a revolution.”63 
Within two years, Eastman left Milwaukee and indeed the United
States altogether for a European tour with Bennie in tow.  In Europe, she
would come into contact with the beginnings of an internationalist
movement for woman’s suffrage, a movement that sought to transcend the
boundaries of the nation-states that had so long excluded women from full
citizenship.64  What she could not have guessed then was that the new
internationalist venture on which she embarked would soon bring her back
around to the relationship between individual rights and the new institutions
of the modern state.  This time, however, she would be a crucial figure in
the conversion of the internationalist impulse into the modern American
civil liberties tradition.  Through the looking glass of internationalism, she
would reach back into the available stock of nineteenth-century legal-liberal
forms to elaborate the quintessential strategy for resistance to the modern
state she had helped design.
II
On August 29, 1914, 1500 women paraded silently down Fifth
Avenue in New York City from Fifty-Eighth Street to Seventeenth Street.
An “intense hush prevailed” along the parade route, reported the New York
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Herald, broken only by the “dirge-like roll of the muffled drums” that
accompanied the marchers.  The great mass of the marchers were “robed in
black,” wrote the New York Times.  In contrast, the banner carriers, carrying
a banner of a dove with an olive branch, were dressed in white with black
arm bands.  “There were women of all nations,” from India and China to
Russia and Germany, “but they all wore the mourning symbol to show that”
notwithstanding the war that had broken out in Europe, “they marched not
as nations, but as sorrowing women together.”65 
The Woman’s Peace Parade, as the march became known, marked
the beginnings of World War I and of a movement against American
intervention in the Great War.  Over the course of the next two years, the
parade – of which Crystal Eastman had been an organizer – gave rise to a
host of like-minded organizations opposed to the war and to the United
States’s possible intervention in it.  With Eastman’s help, Chicago social
worker and public intellectual Jane Addams and American woman’s
suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt formed the Woman’s Peace Party in
January 1915.  Eastman herself – along with her old friend Paul Kellogg
and the prominent settlement house leader Lillian Wald – organized the
American Union Against Militarism in December 1915 and January 1916.
Similar associations (with almost all of which Eastman had significant
contact) included the Union for Democratic Control, the People’s Council,
the American Conference for Democracy and Terms of Peace, the American
League to Limit Armaments, the American Neutral Conference Committee,
the Emergency Peace Federation, and the Fellowship of Reconciliation, all
of which sprung up in the period between 1914 and 1917 in hopes of
discouraging American entry into the war.66
Perhaps only nationalist prejudices can explain the failure of
American historians to identify more strongly the beginnings of the civil
liberties movement with the moment of international engagement out of
which it arose.  The Woman’s Peace Parade Committee and the
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organizations that followed in its wake formed the American wing of what
international lawyer Nathaniel Berman has called “international legal
modernism.”67  Indeed, when Crystal Eastman and colleagues like Addams
and Wald took up the fight against militarism and war in 1914, their efforts
were the culmination of more than four decades of ideas in the United
States and in Europe about the development of new international legal
structures.  And as the symbolism of the 1914 parade indicated, among the
most important of these ideas was the notion that sovereign nation states
ought to be subordinated at least in part to those international institutions.
Discussions among “internationalists,” as they typically called
themselves, often began with an observation that (in a variety of related
forms) has continued to be made ever since, right up into discussions of
twenty-first-century globalization.  Technology, they announced, had made
the world a smaller place.  As Eastman’s teacher Giddings was fond of
observing, the extension of “communication throughout the world” by
means of a century of technological advances, from the steam ship and the
railroad, to the telegraph, the telephone, and the wireless radio had brought
the nations, races, and civilizations of the world into much closer contact
than ever before.68  International treaties and fledgling international
organizations followed.  European nations signed a multilateral convention
on telegraph communications in 1865; the Universal Postal Union followed
nine years later; and in 1890, European diplomats crafted a uniform law for
the international transport of goods by rail.69  
All told, the century following the end of the Napoleonic Wars
witnessed the promulgation of an extraordinary outpouring of international
treaties: some 16,000, by one count.70  Many of these were traditional
bilateral treaty agreements between states.  An increasing number of them
were multilateral, law-making treaties on issues ranging from tariffs,
copyrights, and patents, to the treatment of war wounded.  The crowning
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achievements of the multilateral agreements of the late nineteenth century
international lawyers were the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.
Initiated by Czar Nicholas II, who secretly feared that he would be unable
to keep up in the European arms race, the Conferences sought (among other
things) to create international agreements for the peaceful resolution of
disputes among nation states.  And although the agreements on this point
that emerged from the Conferences were hedged with reservations, the First
Conference produced a Permanent Court of Arbitration for the pacific
resolution of international disputes.  The Second Conference, in turn,
strengthened the Court of Arbitration and authorized the creation of an
International Prize Court to decide disputes over vessels and cargo seized
on the high seas.71  Much remained to be done, but participants believed that
much progress had been made; indeed, as the closing address of the Second
Conference stated, the Conference had made the “greatest” progress “that
mankind has ever made” toward “the maintenance of peaceful relations
between nations.”72
The Hague Conferences quickly captured the hearts and minds of
the international lawyers.  Already for several decades, the gradual
development of international institutions had encouraged “a new
professional self-awareness and enthusiasm” among international lawyers
in Europe and in the United States, committed to the spreading of what a
small but enthusiastic young group of European lawyers in 1867 called
“l’esprit d’ internationalité.”73  By the end of the next year, a cadre of
international lawyers from England, Italy, and the Netherlands had begun
publishing a professional journal, the Revue de droit international et de
législation comparée.  A professional association, the Institut de Droit
International, was founded in Belgium in 1873; in the same year, another
group of European international lawyers formed the Association for the
Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations.  Internationalism, in short,
was developing an organized constituency with a professional self-
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American internationalists followed fast on the heels of the
European international lawyers.  Peace advocates, leading businessmen, and
international lawyers gathered beginning in 1895 for an annual Conference
on International Arbitration at Lake Mohonk in the foothills of New York’s
Catskill Mountains to discuss alternatives to armed conflict in the resolution
of disputes among nations.75  The next year, eminent figures in business,
education, the ministry, law, medicine, and the armed forces held an
American Conference on International Arbitration in Washington; they
reconvened at a Second American Conference in 1904, at which labor
unions, chambers of commerce, and the mayors and governors of dozens of
cities and states expressed their ardent support for the arbitration of
international disputes.76  In 1905, a group of international lawyers at the
Lake Mohonk Conference established the American Society for
International Law.77  The American Association for International
Conciliation (1906) was founded to “awaken interest” in “international law,
international conduct, and international organization.”  The New York
Peace Society (1906) brought together men of affairs in New York City, as
did similar associations in places like Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, and
Maryland.  A National Peace Congress met in New York in 1907, spinning
off new peace and arbitration advocacy groups of its own, including the
American School Peace League, dedicated to teaching “broad ideas of
international justice, universal brotherhood, and world organization” in
American schools.  In July 1910, wealthy publisher Edward Ginn founded
the World Peace Foundation with a grant of $1 million, and in December
of the same year, Andrew Carnegie endowed the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace with a massive $10 million gift.78  
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From the proliferation of American international law and peace
organizations came what one historian has called a “veritable flood of plans
for world courts, world federation, and world government.”79  Indeed,
American international lawyers adopted a utopian exuberance.  The
formation of international law societies and other developments in the field
of international law led many American international lawyers – along with
any number of their peers across the Atlantic – to believe that they were
watching the dawning of a “new internationalism” in which war between
nation states would be rendered obsolete as a mechanism for the resolution
of international disputes.80  A century of relative peace had brought forth a
new system of relations among states, symbolized by the Hague
Conferences.  In the Permanent Court of Arbitration as a machinery for the
“friendly settlement of international disputes,” internationalists saw the
progressive substitution of “the empire of law” for the “anarchy” of state
rivalries.81  And with the example of the Hague Conferences before them,
American internationalists found themselves involved in an increasingly
heady new conversation about what Nicholas Murray Butler — following
the European lawyers’ esprit d’internationalité – began to call “the
international mind.”82  As early as 1889 and 1890, Secretary of State James
Blaine had described an agreement to arbitrate disputes among western
hemisphere nation states as the new “Magna Charta” of international
peace.”83  President McKinley announced at his inauguration in 1897 that
the “importance and moral influence” of arbitration among states could
“hardly be overestimated in the cause of advancing mankind.”84  Indeed,
other commentators suggested that arbitrations of nation-state disputes
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would complete “the process of substituting law for war,” vindicate the
possibility of a “spiritual evolution for mankind,” and give life to an “all-
embracing” idea of “brotherly love” and a “bond of union transcending
national, racial or color lines.85  International arbitrations would give rise to
“nothing less than a court of the nations” to decide disputes among peoples
“according to eternal principles of law and equity,” argued President
William Howard Taft.86  “Never before,” announced an advocate of the
“new internationalism,” had “there been such a universal revulsion against
force as a means of settling international quarrels.”87  War, Andrew
Carnegie declared upon the formation of his Endowment for International
Peace, had been “discarded as disgraceful to civilized men,” much as
dueling and slavery had been discarded in the century before.88  The
“glorious example of reason and peace,” McKinley explained, would at last
triumph over “passion and war.”  And as leading American international
lawyers like Elihu Root observed again and again, the United States – as the
world’s greatest and freest republic – seemed to have an unequaled “power
and influence” in this “new era of the law of nations” to bring about “peace
and justice” and “civilization and brotherhood for all mankind.”89
Yet there were actually at least two distinct internationalisms at
work in early twentieth-century American thinking.  Many elite
international lawyers – and preeminently Elihu Root – took up the orthodox
version of American internationalism.  As Secretary of War under
McKinley and then Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt, Root had
helped to craft the United States’s renewed engagement with the world after
a century of relative isolation.  He shaped U.S. authority and defended U.S.
interests in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-
American War.  In 1907, he co-sponsored a Central American Peace
Conference that established the Central American Court of Justice.  And in
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that same year he orchestrated American involvement in the Second Hague
Conference.  Indeed, for his efforts as secretary of state and as a U.S.
Senator thereafter, and for his work as the president of both of the American
Society of International Law and the Carnegie Endowment, Root was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1912.90  
Root’s conception of internationalism viewed the sovereignty of
nation states as the foundational building blocks of international law.  The
law of nations, on the orthodox view, was organized around the practices
and agreements of sovereign states.  “The independence of nations,” Root
wrote in his Nobel Prize Address of 1912, “lies at the basis of the present
social organization of the civilized world.”91  As “between two mutually
exclusive sovereignties,” he had explained three years earlier in a
presidential address to the American Society for International Law, “each
is supreme and subject to no compulsion on its own side of the line.”  The
world was therefore “not ready” for a “parliament of man with authority to
control the conduct of nations,” nor for “an international police force with
power to enforce national conformity to rules of right conduct.”92  Instead,
those seeking to work for peace, Root explained, were best advised to
“stand behind the men who are in the responsible positions of
government.”93 
If truth be told, even Root’s nineteenth-century orthodoxy made
room for international constraints on the sovereignty of nation-states.  On
Root’s account, international law assumed the consent of all states to a
minimal baseline standard of conduct.  Nations “in the exercise of their
individual sovereignty” were required to conform to “a standard of
international conduct” deduced from the “universal postulate” that “every
sovereign nation is willing at all times and under all circumstances to do
what is just.”94  Like a Lockean social contract writ global, the implied
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consent of nation states to this baseline standard created theoretical
constraints on the sovereignty of states even under Root’s orthodox
approach to the law of nations.
The second strand of American internationalism, however, focused
much more explicitly on creating international constraints on the nation
state.  “To trust traditional political ‘organization’ to create peaceful
relations between nations,” argued advocates of this second strand of
internationalism, inevitably involved “reliance upon” precisely the
“exaggerated nationalistic and power politics” that had caused crises
between rival powers in the first place.95  Radical internationalists like John
Dewey and Jane Addams thus sought to move beyond the building-blocks
of nation states to new international structures.  And as Dewey’s inclusion
in the ranks of the radical internationalists suggests, this second approach
to internationalism brought to bear the skeptical force of pragmatic thinking
on the concept of the nation state.  Jane Addams warned that “nationalistic
words” and “patriotic phrases” were “abstractions” with dangerous power.
Disputes among nations, she argued, were like international conventions for
railroads, telegraphs, and commercial paper; they required solutions that
“transcended national boundaries” and they could not be solved “while
men’s minds were still held apart” by the “national suspicions and rivalries”
that nation-states so often generated.96  It was those suspicions and rivalries
that made the legal fiction of nation states – “artificial units of loyalty,” as
Max Eastman put it – so dangerous.97  Indeed, nation-state rivalries, argued
Addams’s colleague Norman Thomas, ensured that no nation could prepare
to defend itself without “awaken[ing] suspicion” among its neighbors, who
would be forced to “keep up a race in armaments” that would lead to regular
“nationalistic struggles.”98  What the radical internationalists like Addams
offered instead, as Max Eastman put it in 1916, was a world in which
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humanity would break the cycle of competitive rivalries to “join together
in international union.”  War, he urged, might thus be eliminated “exactly
as wars of family and clan and city” had been “eliminated by national
union.”99
As World War One approached, Crystal Eastman joined the
increasingly vocal cadre of radical internationalists who argued that
nationalism (though only recently a positive force for the self-determination
of peoples) had become a Trojan horse for militaristic arms races among
European powers.  There were, to be sure, a variety of different approaches
to internationalism even within the radical wing of American
internationalism.  Norman Thomas held a Christian-pacifist
“internationalism based on the universal brotherhood of the children of
God.”100  Others came to internationalism from the perspective of a socialist
critique of the state.101  Still others were latter day James Madisons, seeing
in the relationships among states in the American federal system a principle
that might be extended among nation states.102  Some, like one American
conscientious objector in August 1917, claimed simply that
“internationalism” was their “only principle.”103  What this eclectic array of
radical internationalisms agreed upon, however, was that nationalism all too
often and all too easily gave way to militarism, which was an especially
virulent form of nationalism.  Militarism was “the aggressive spirit and
unfriendly point of view toward other nations,” which created “parochial
hostility,” “national aggression,” and a “national psychology of fear,” all of
which led “inevitably . . . to conflict.”  In its place, Eastman and the radical
internationalists advanced a conception of cosmopolitan democracy as the
“mutual recognition of the rights of other men, irrespective of creed, color
or national boundaries.”   Their internationalist aim was thus to create
transnational institutions that would contain the threat of militarism by
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eclipsing the ostensibly unquestioned authority of nation states in the
orthodox nineteenth-century view of international law.104
During the two and a half years between August 1914 and March
1917, Eastman became perhaps the leading organizer of the radical
internationalist movement.  By early 1916, she was serving as the Executive
Secretary of the American Union Against Militarism and as the chair of the
active New York City branch of the Woman’s Peace Party.  Both
organizations adopted the positions of the radical internationalists, opposing
the militarism of nation-state rivalries and supporting a world federation to
transcend them.  The Peace Party sought to serve as a world-wide “clearing-
house” for internationalist ideas during the war.  It urged the
democratization of foreign policy; the abrogation of secret treaties; and the
nationalization of arms manufacture to remove commercial incentives to the
whipping-up of nationalist fervor.105  The American Union, in turn, pursued
a nearly identical program to “work against militarism” and to build
“toward world federation, which alone would make disarmament possible,
and which alone could really root out militarism.”106
The American Union developed into America’s most important
radical internationalist organization, with Eastman (in Lillian Wald’s
words) as its “wonderful secretary.”107  Eastman worked to ensure that all
of the “energy and genius” of the Union would “be directed toward putting
this idea of a world federation into workable form, acceptable to all
nations.”  As she conceived it, the American Union’s aim was to “keep the
ideal of internationalism alive and growing in the minds and hearts of the
American people.”108  Indeed, the organization’s international program was
lifted almost directly from the eclectic array of ideas that had been bandied
about by American and European internationalists for decades: self-
determination; equal treatment for all nations; a “Society of Nations”
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developed through the Hague Conference, along with a “permanent Court
of International Justice” to strengthen the existing Hague Court of
Arbitration; reductions in armaments; the voiding of secret treaties; and the
removal of restraints on international trade.  Members of the American
Union protested the war’s diversion of public attention away from “World
Peace based on International Agreement” and called for a “democratic
federation of American republics as a step toward international
government.”109  They testified, as Eastman did before Congress in January
1916, against the creeping militarism that had created a dangerous arms
race.110  And they urged the President to take up the so-called Hensley
Resolution in the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, authorizing the
President to convene a Conference of Nations for disarmament.  Eastman
and her colleagues advocated such policies as they believed would be steps
toward what she called in her congressional testimony “unnationalism”: a
“federation of nations” dedicated to “democracy, to peace, and to their
mutual good will and friendship.”111
Of course, the radical internationalists’ ideas were often utopian and
impractical.  But it is important to remember they were no more so than
many of the ideas that had been spinning out of internationalist
conversations on both sides of the Atlantic.  Radical internationalism was
continuous with the international lawyers’ esprit d’internationalité.  Indeed,
the radicals of 1914 to 1917 drew their inspiration from virtually the same
set of developments that had been sending international lawyers into flights
of fantastic rhetoric for the previous half-century.  Like international
lawyers since the 1870s, Crystal Eastman’s Woman’s Peace Party of New
York City, for example, pointed to the development of the Universal Postal
Union and the International Telegraphic Union and to the proliferation of
international commercial associations such as the International Congress of
Chambers of Commerce.  The world, it seemed, was growing smaller;
according to orthodox and radical internationalist alike, it was “already in
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large measure internationalized.”  And like Andrew Carnegie just a few
years before, Eastman and her colleagues cited the international
condemnation of slavery in the nineteenth century as demonstration of the
moral progress that international action could achieve in the newly close
quarters of the twentieth.112   
In fact, the same questions of nation state sovereignty and of the
citizen’s obligations to work through the official channels of the state that
divided the orthodox internationalists from the radicals reappeared within
ostensibly radical organizations like the Woman’s Peace Party and the
American Union.  In the latter organization, for example, leading members
like Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg believed strongly in working through
the instrumentalities of the national government to advance their
internationalist aims.  Congressional hearings, “personal work with
congressmen,” and discrete advocacy with the President Wilson and his
Secretary of War Newton Baker were their preferred methods of action.
The American Union therefore kept up into early 1917 a campaign of
private advocacy and personal meetings with Wilson, Baker, and others in
the Wilson Administration.113  
Eastman, by contrast, took up the radical wing of even the nation-
state skeptics in the internationalist movement.  She was, Wald suggested,
enamored of an “impulsive radicalism.”114  (Members of the WPP quietly
warned that she was too radical to “greatly help the movement.”115)
Eastman’s more confrontational tactics included propaganda campaigns,
national speaking tours, and mass meetings.  By the spring of 1916, she was
organizing a public exhibit that included Jingo the Dinosaur (“All Armor
Plate – No Brains,” read the collar on the paper-mâché caricature of
militarist nationalism), whose aggressive personality and tiny brain had led
to its own extinction.  A speaking tour through the mid-west followed,
reaching an estimated 40,000 listeners.  By May, Eastman had collected the
names of 5,000 supporters and distributed over 600,000 “pieces of
propaganda.”  Internationalism, she insisted, was a movement to be pursued
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by “the people acting directly – not through their governments or diplomats
or armies.”116 
Internationally-minded women like Eastman had good reason to
adopt a stance of skepticism toward the official channels of the nation state.
As woman’s movements across Europe and in the United States had
observed throughout the nineteenth century, states had long excluded them
from full membership.  Annis Ford Eastman, for one, had noted long before
that women (and especially married women) had at best a complicated
relationship to the conventional categories of nation-state citizenship.
States typically disabled women from service as soldier, property owner,
voter, officer of the court, or public official.117  Indeed, in 1916, Eastman
encountered first-hand the limnal status of women in the modern nation
state when she divorced Bennie and married Walter Fuller, a citizen of
Great Britain whom she had met through their joint involvement in the early
stages of the American Union.  By virtue of a law enacted by Congress in
1907118 and upheld by the Supreme Court in the year before Eastman’s
marriage,119 American women automatically took the nationality of their
husbands.  As a result, Eastman herself – though still living in the United
States – was stripped of her U.S. citizenship when she married Walter.  It
should hardly be surprising, then, that many women adopted
confrontational tactics – publicity, mass meetings, and direct action by the
people – that skirted the official channels of the state.  The state, after all,
had long made it exceedingly difficult for women to act through those
official channels.  And just as many American women by the 1910s –
Eastman included – were being drawn to the radical suffragist tactics of the
British suffragettes, so too were they drawn to such tactics in the
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Eastman and the Woman’s Peace Party of New York were not complete utopians.  “There will still be
numerous independent sovereign nations” after the war was finished, they conceded, but at the very least
the war’s end could bring into being some kind of international structures to mediate the militarist
internationalist campaign against militarist nationalism.120  
For Eastman and many other women in internationalist circles,
women’s persistent second-class citizenship highlighted the dangers of the
nation state and its nationalist symbols.  In the journal Four Lights, the
magazine of the Woman’s Peace Party of New York City, Eastman and her
colleagues attacked the nation state as a kind of artificial superstition.
“Long ago,” wrote one Four Lights author, “we drew ‘imaginary’ lines over
our globe . . . we put deep-printed lines over latitudes and longitudes,
believing that lines can separate the nations of the earth.”  Over time, those
imaginary lines had hardened into divisions among peoples, “conceiving
those across our crooked lines as hostages, enemies, or at best, remote and
unlike peoples.”  The “foolish little boundaries” of imaginary maps,
however, were now under attack from a band of “Internationalists” who
were “as disturbing to your nationalistic Flatlander as the witches to
Salem.”  On the internationalist view, Four Lights explained, the “boundary
lines of nations are as imaginary as the equatorial line”; the people on the
other side were “neighbors and friends instead of strangers and enemies.”121
Indeed, the internationalist agenda, as Eastman and the Four Lights editors
of the Women’s Peace Party of New York City conceived it, was no less
than “to destroy geography” by “welding the nations of the world into the
United States of the World.”122
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What women-led antiwar organizations had done was to sharpen
two decades’ worth of growing skepticism about a nineteenth-century
abstraction.  But it was not skepticism about the abstraction of rights.  It
was instead skepticism about that other great nineteenth-century legal
abstraction: the sovereignty of nation states, which in internationalist circles
had come already to seem little more than an abstract “relic from an earlier
era,” as international lawyer Louis Henkin would later describe it, made up
of “fictions upon fictions.”123  Here was one of the most dangerous of “a
priori truths,” in Addams’s words, a fiction that inspired “violent loyalty”
and caused “men in a nation, an army, a crowd” to do things “horrible as
well as heroic that they could never do alone.”124  The nation had become
a kind of “metaphysical entity,” complained Norman Thomas, “apart from
the individuals who compose it.”125  Rights might have been a nineteenth-
century idea newly vulnerable in an era of war and pragmatism, but so too
was the state.  As Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in
January 1917, conditions in the United States were right for a collision
between the obligations of loyalty exacted by the nation state, on one hand,
and internationalist ideals of an evolving cosmopolitan citizenship, on the
other.  That collision would initiate the twentieth-century civil liberties
movement.
III. 
It was one thing to question the form of the nation state in 1916, to
describe it as a dangerous legal fiction, and to call for its eclipse by new
systems of international governance.  But once the United States entered the
war in April 1917, questions about citizens’ obligations to the state were no
longer merely theoretical.  Among U.S. internationalists, intervention in the
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war thus precipitated a scramble for a position between loyalty and
internationalism.  “After war was declared, we of course ceased all
opposition to it,” explained one member of the American Union.126  At the
Woman’s Peace Party, the reaction was the same: “All the activities of the
Woman’s Peace Party have been, of course, modified by entrance into the
World War.”127  And as far as Crystal’s long-time friend Paul Kellogg was
concerned, he was “not blocking the prosecution of war, now that the
decision has been made against me.”128  The loyalty obligations of the
nation state, in short, seemed to many to trump the internationalist agenda.
In the words of Elihu Root, “the question of war and peace” had “now been
decided by the President and congress.”  “The question thus no longer
remains open,” Root concluded, and it had become the duty of American
citizens “to stop discussion upon the question decided” lest criticism
weaken the power of the nation to “succeed in the war upon which” it had
entered.129  As William R. Vance, dean of the University of Minnesota Law
School, summed up in 1917, “wartime was no time to quibble about
constitutional rights and guarantees.”130  Indeed, the mere “suggestion” of
opposition to conscription – a position that had formed one of the American
Union’s deepest commitments – now seemed to many no different than
“treason,” and its advocates “traitors” to “be dealt with accordingly.”131
Whether the American Union would be able to identify an
intermediate position between loyalty and internationalism seemed to turn
in large part on the Wilson administration’s wartime stance toward the
radical internationalists.  As a rhetorical matter, at least, Wilson often allied
himself with radical internationalists such as Addams and Eastman.  As far
back as the 1880s, Wilson had tentatively endorsed the idea that the world
was witnessing a gradual evolution toward “confederation” among states on
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the model of the United States.  He taught International Law at Princeton
in 1892.  In 1908 he joined the American Peace Society.132  And once war
broke out in 1914, he appealed to Americans to remain “neutral in fact as
well as in name,” while privately endorsing the idea of “an association of
nations” and opening a dialogue with peace organizations such as the
Carnegie Endowment and the League to Enforce Peace.133  In 1916, Wilson
privately assured a delegation from the American Union that he was
working toward a “joint effort” on a world-scale to “keep the peace”; two
months later, he came out publicly in favor of the principle of a “League of
Peace” by which the “nations of the world” would “band themselves
together to see that . . . right prevails.”  And in his famous “Fourteen
Points” speech to the Senate in January 1917, he called again for an
international “concert of power which would make it virtually impossible
that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again.”  Indeed,
Wilson’s vision for a postwar order often looked remarkably like that of
internationalists in the American Union.  To allow nationalistic ambitions
to shape the peace would be merely to ensure the resurgence of the national
rivalries that had caused it in the first place.  Instead, Wilson urged a peace
based on the “equality of rights” among nations; “free access” for all
nations to the seas and to international commerce; and the “limitation of
armies” and of “military preparation.”134  Moreover, many of his public
addresses seemed, like Eastman’s antimilitarist tactics, to skirt the official
channels of nation-state diplomacy.  Wilson spoke eloquently of reaching
“the peoples of Europe over the heads of their Rulers”; as he told one
correspondent, his “Peace Without Victory” speech was addressed not to
the Senate, nor even to “foreign governments,” but to “the people of the
countries now at war.”135  Wilson, in short, seemed to have embraced the
hopeful idealism of the pre-war internationalist spirit.  And not surprisingly,
leaders of the American Union and the Woman’s Peace Party thus saw in
Wilson’s bold internationalist rhetoric of 1916 and 1917 their own
aspirations for post-war international order.  Even as late as the beginning
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of 1918, for example, Crystal and Max supported the President, endorsing
“his demand for an international union, based upon free seas, free
commerce and general disarmament.”136
In practice, however, Wilson proved to be an ardent believer in
Root’s orthodox approach to the relationship between states and individuals
in the law of nations.  Wilson claimed that the United States had entered the
war to pursue the “vindication of right, of human right,” the “rights of
mankind.”  But those rights were to be advanced on the international stage
by vindicating the rights not of individuals but of nation states.  “We shall
be satisfied,” Wilson told the assembled joint session of Congress, when
human rights “have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of
nations can make them.”  In the final analysis, Wilson’s internationalism
aimed to ensure the “rights and liberties” of “nations great and small,” and
in particular “the most sacred rights of our nation.”137  His “concert of free
peoples” was just that – an association of peoples organized in nation states
for the purpose of bringing “peace and safety to all nations.”  And when the
war came to the United States, Wilson became a powerful (if occasionally
reluctant) believer in the overriding power of citizens’ obligations of loyalty
to the state.  War, he warned Frank Cobb of the New York World in March
1917, would require “illiberalism at home to reinforce the men at the front.”
“The Constitution,” Wilson continued, “would not survive it,” and “free
speech and the right of assembly would go,” too.138  And by May 1917,
merely a month after American entry into the war, Wilson had already
begun to shut down the conversations that he had helped to start about the
shape of post-war internationalism.  They were, he answered, “very unwise”
while the war was still pending.139 
With the Wilson administration’s approval and encouragement,
state and federal governments alike enacted new legislation to enforce the
loyalty to the nation required of citizens.  Congress in February 1917 had
debated legislation to punish those who intentionally caused disaffection in
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the armed forces, or who intentionally interfered in military operations.140
With the declaration of war on April 6, such legislation became a virtual
certainty.  Congress authorized selective conscription, which Wilson put
into effect by requiring registration of all men ages twenty-one to thirty on
June 5.141  The Espionage Act, enacted June 15, authorized criminal
prosecution of spies and of anyone who obstructed recruitment or
enlistment, or who caused or attempted to cause insubordination or
disloyalty in military or naval forces.142  By the same Act, materials
violating the Act or otherwise “urging treason” were “declared to be
nonmailable matter” not to be delivered by the Postmaster General.143  The
Trading with the Enemy Act limited commerce and communication with
enemies of the United States.144  Amendments to the Espionage Act in May
1918 prohibited disloyal or abusive language about “the form of
government in the United States,” or its flag, uniforms, or military or naval
forces.145  From Montana and Texas to Minnesota and Nebraska, similar
developments produced dozens of new laws at the state and municipal level
banning expressions of opposition to the war.146
Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson and Attorney General
Thomas Gregory enforced the new legislation with an enthusiastic abandon
that the New York World called “an intellectual reign of terror in the United
States.”  “May God have mercy” on dissenters from the nation’s war plans,
thundered Gregory, “for they need expect none from an outraged people
and an avenging government.”147  Between 1917 and the end of 1921, the
federal government would commence more than 2,000 prosecutions under
the Espionage Act.  Dozens of foreign language newspapers were shut
down under authority extended to Burleson pursuant to the Trading with the
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Enemy Act.  Newspapers such as the conservative socialist Milwaukee
Leader were denied mailing privileges, as were 74 other newspapers by the
fall of 1918.  Even the eminently respectable Nation was barred from the
mails on Burleson’s order until Wilson stepped in and reversed it.148  The
August 1917 issue of Max Eastman’s avant-garde radical journal The
Masses was declared unmailable by Burleson and Gregory for its anti-war
cartoons and its opposition to the draft.  After an order by U.S. District
Judge Learned Hand ordering Burleson to mail the issue was stayed and
overturned by the Court of Appeals, Burleson revoked The Masses second-
class mailing privileges altogether for having missed an issue and thus
failing to remain a “periodical” within the meaning of the second-class mail
law.149  
Private and quasi-private patriotism were often as powerful a force
as the authority of the state.  Ad hoc vigilante gangs and patriots –
organizations like the American Defense Society, the American Protective
League, the National Liberty League, the Liberty League, the Knights of
Liberty, the American Rights League, and the Boy Spies of America –
smashed anti-war demonstrations, interrupted pacifist speaking halls, and
lynched men suspected of pro-German leanings.150  The more respectable
National Security League held events urging national loyalty and
condemning those whom Theodore Roosevelt (who would become
increasingly outspoken in his nationalism during the war) called
“weaklings, illusionists, materialists, lukewarm Americans and faddists of
all the types that vitiate sound nationalism.”151  Security League speakers
were supplemented by the thousands of speakers (“Four Minute Men,” as
they were known) who operated out of the federal government’s Committee
on Public Information.  Headed by former journalist George Creel, the CPI
spearheaded a massive propaganda campaign in the form of an
extraordinary 75 million pamphlets and as many as 6000 press releases,
virtually all broadcasting the importance of national loyalty in time of
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war.152  As one Security League speaker summed up the message of the
patriotic campaign of 1917, the nationalist view was that “citizenship means
everything or nothing.”  Citizens “should refrain from fractious criticism,”
speakers cautioned, and openly display their support for the war effort lest
they be mistaken for the kinds of “unconditional traitors” who hid
treasonous attitudes beneath an outward display of silence.153  And in the
new post-war atmosphere, those whom Roosevelt and his nationalist allies
scorned as “professional internationalists” were most at risk.154  Treasury
Secretary William McAdoo declared in October 1917 that advocacy of
internationalism during wartime was “in effect traitorous.”155  Others
expressed the same sentiment in less civilized fashion, scrawling slogans
like “Treason’s Twilight Zone” on the doors to the American Union’s
offices.156
For Crystal Eastman and her American Union colleagues, the
wartime atmosphere of mandatory loyalty to the nation state made it
extraordinarily important to determine “the logical, courageous, and at the
same time law abiding” role for internationalists.  “Extreme patriots would
have us go out of business,” she observed, while “extremists of another
sort” would surely put them all “in the federal penitentiary.”  Moreover,
many items on the American Union’s pre-war agenda were now
“impracticable,” opposition to entry into the war not the least among
them.157  Yet as the spring of 1917 wore on, a new role seemed increasingly
available.  Woodrow Wilson, as historian John Blum has noted, “turned his
back on civil liberties . . . because he loved his vision of the eventual peace
more.”158  But what if the radical internationalists had been right about the
importance of skirting the official channels of the nation state?  If radically
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democratic interventions in foreign policy were really necessary to avoid
the drift toward militarist nationalism, nongovernmental organizations like
the American Union would have to be able to articulate views other than
those approved by the state.  The very conversation about post-war
internationalism that Wilson had started would have to be continued,
whether Wilson approved of it or not.  Yet if radical antimilitarists were to
carry on their advocacy of a new internationalism in the place of the nation
state, they should have to establish some kind of protection from the very
authority they sought to displace.  
In the spring of 1917, civil liberties emerged as the solution to the
dilemma of the internationalists in wartime.  As American Union member
John Haynes Holmes would later remember, American entry into the war
meant that disarmament and attendant internationalist goals were, “for the
time being at least,” a “lost cause.  But lo, as though to engage our liberal
efforts afresh, there came suddenly to the fore in our nation’s life the new
issue of civil liberties.”159  Already in April, 1917, the American Union
called for an “immediate anti-conscription campaign” and “cooperation in
the defense of free speech and free assembly during the war.”160  Americans
might no longer be able safely to argue against the war effort, but they
could surely work “to prevent and oppose all those extreme manifestations
of militarism” that seemed certain to follow in war’s wake: “the brutal
treatment of the conscientious objector,” “the denial of free speech,” and
“the suppressing of minority press.”161  The resolution of the
internationalist’s crisis, in short, was to fight “the general abrogation of civil
liberty” that the war among nation states had brought in its wake.  Indeed,
such work, American Union leaders argued, was “the logical consequence
of what we have been doing for two years.”162  As Eastman urged, the
defense of conscientious objectors and the protection of civil liberties had
a “natural and logical place in the progress of our activities.”  The American
Union, in her view, was the “logical group to defend the other American
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liberties, free speech, free press and free assembly.”163 
As the organization put it in a press release in the fall of 1917, a
“Union Against Militarism becomes, during war time, inevitably a Union
for Defense of Civil Liberty.”164  In late June, the Conscientious Objectors’
Bureau of the American Union, which had been tentatively formed two
months before, was remade into the “Civil Liberties Bureau.”165  Even the
name of the new American Union’s new bureau was drawn from the
transatlantic internationalist conversation.  Though the term “civil liberty”
had long been a part of English and American law and political theory, its
disaggregation into the plural “civil liberties” had been popularized just a
year earlier by the British National Council for Civil Liberties.  Walter
Fuller, Eastman’s new husband, was closely connected to the British
organization’s founders; he would later become its corresponding secretary.
And in late June, the American Union adopted the National Council’s
phrase, “Civil Liberties,” as its own.  Roger Baldwin, a recent addition to
the American Union staff who headed-up the new Civil Liberties Bureau,
would later recall that the Bureau’s name represented “the first time that the
phrase ‘civil liberties’ had been so used in the United States.”  Within
weeks, “civil liberties” had become the “chief war work” of the leading
radical-internationalist organization.166  
For Eastman, the new emphasis on civil liberties was a continuation
of the Union’s internationalist agenda.  Since its founding, the Union had
warned of the threats that militarism posed to domestic civil liberties.  Now
that war had materialized, however, the defense of civil liberties was a
necessary precondition to the advancement of internationalist hopes.
Norman Thomas argued that “the country which [suppresses civil liberties]
will never commend democracy to the world.”167  Drawing on ideas that had
been advanced more than a century before by Immanuel Kant, Eastman
further contended that all nations needed to “be democratized before a
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federated world can be achieved.”168  At the very least, it seemed clear, as
a small but growing number of people ranging from the members of the
Woman’s Peace Party of New York City to Senator Joseph I. France of
Maryland noted, that “full free and continuous discussion” of matters of
great public import – the nation’s war aims, peace terms, and treaty
negotiations – required “freedom of the press” and “freedom of speech.”169
Early efforts in the Civil Liberties Bureau aimed to advance the
Union’s pre-existing internationalist agenda.  The Bureau concentrated not
on the defense of socialists, members of the Industrial Workers of the
World, or other political radicals, but on the defense of conscientious
objectors and the protection of the remaining strands of anti-militarist
activism.  Bureau insiders even sought to get the government to distinguish
such radicals as the I.W.W. members from the “fine type” of conscientious
objector who could be found in the nation’s universities and in whom the
Bureau had invested its hopes for American internationalism.170  Indeed, the
Bureau and its allies in the internationalist camp often understood their use
of civil liberties claims not as authentic expressions of a commitment to the
virtues of the Bill of Rights, but rather as a means for the strategic
advancement of the internationalist aspirations.  Roger Baldwin of the
American Union put it most cynically, perhaps, when he instructed a
colleague “to get a good lot of flags” and “talk a good deal about the
Constitution.”171  Nonetheless, Baldwin’s strategic appropriation of
constitutional rights as symbols of American nationalism captured the spirit
of the organization’s turn to civil liberties in 1917.  The American Union
had advocated international institutions for years precisely because those
institutions seemed better able than nation states to secure human freedom
and democracy.  But in 1917 the organization’s members began to make
claims in terms of the Bill of Rights rather than in terms of new
international institutions.  
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Over the summer and fall of 1917, Eastman worked closely in the
Union’s civil liberties work alongside Roger Baldwin.  As Baldwin would
later recall, Eastman had been his “first associate in World War I days.”172
They defended conscientious objectors and assisted in the legal defense of
antiwar agitators.  Eastman even developed an ambitious plan of test cases
to try the “actual testing of the right to free speech” in those places in which
it had been limited.173  And yet Baldwin emerged as the leader of the
Bureau.  It was a development that had significant implications for the
future of the relationship between the internationalist agenda and the
fledgling civil liberties movement.  
IV.
Eastman missed the beginnings of the American Union’s war time
move to civil liberties.  On March 19, 1917, she gave birth to her first child,
Jeffrey Fuller.  The birth appears to have had lasting effects on Eastman’s
health.  She had always been susceptible to sickness.  When Eastman was
3, she and her older brother Morgan came down with scarlet fever.  Morgan
died, and though Crystal survived, she regularly suffered debilitating
illnesses thereafter.174  In 1911, she had broken off her engagement with the
state employers’ liability commission because of illness.  In April 1916, she
had become ill again during the Union’s truth About Preparedness Tour,
and was ordered “kept strictly in bed” for several weeks.175  With Jeffrey’s
birth, Eastman developed a “chronic disease of her kidneys,” as Max later
described it, that would plague her until her death.176  By March 1921, she
would be forced to resign from the Executive Committee of the Bureau’s
successor, the American Civil Liberties Union.  “I have always been too
tired,” explained the otherwise energetic Eastman.177
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Her complicated pregnancy forced Eastman to take off more than
two months beginning in mid-March 1917.  They were a critical two
months, spanning the beginning of American involvement in the war, and
Eastman knew it.  “I am crazy to get back on the job,” she wrote shortly
after Jeffrey’s birth.  There would be, she feared, “nothing left for me to do”
by the time she got back.178  Most troublingly, Eastman feared that in her
absence the Union would adopt a new agenda taking the Union away from
its radical-internationalist agenda.  Baldwin, in particular, had suggested a
new direction for the group that Eastman found wanting “in a great many
respects.”  She had hoped to meet with Baldwin before giving birth to
Jeffrey and going to Atlantic City to convalesce, but Walter and her
physician insisted that she not.179
During Eastman’s absence, which continued into early June, 1917,
Baldwin had indeed begun to establish himself as the new force in the
Union.  His extraordinary energies matched Eastman’s.  And like Eastman,
he had begun his career in sociologically-informed reform work.  After
graduation from Harvard College, he had gone to St. Louis to found the
sociology department of Washington University and to run a neighborhood
settlement house.  While in St. Louis, Baldwin also became actively
involved in the reform of the city’s criminal courts.  What workmen’s
compensation had been to Eastman, the new juvenile courts and probation
systems were to Baldwin: new socialized systems for modernizing the
nineteenth-century treatment of social problems.  Like workmen’s
compensation, juvenile courts aimed to replace cumbersome inquiries into
individual rights and moral culpability with regimes of social-scientific
expertise designed to provide for needs and manage populations.  Expert
“professional standards,” in Baldwin’s words, would replace traditional
adjudication, which Baldwin had come to think of as simply “judicial
interference.”  While Eastman was counting injured workers in Pittsburgh,
Baldwin helped to found the National Probation Officers’ Association.  A
few years later, he co-authored what would quickly become a leading text
in the field of juvenile justice.  Like Eastman, then, Baldwin came to the
Union and to the Civil Liberties Bureau as someone who had helped to
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construct the new institutions of the modern administrative state.180 
Nonetheless, despite their similar backgrounds in progressive era
sociological reform, Baldwin and Eastman quickly developed an “uneasy”
relationship to one another.  For one thing, Baldwin was both more inclined
and better positioned than Eastman to engage in the kind of quiet advocacy
with government officials that colleagues like Lillian Wald favored.  His
Harvard education and elite background provided him close connections to
insiders at the Department of Justice and the Department of War.
Moreover, Baldwin came to the work of the Union with an essentially
domestic outlook.  Where Eastman had toured Europe, met with
international woman’s suffrage leaders, and encountered European radicals
in the cosmopolitan setting of New York City, Baldwin had gone to the
relatively insular St. Louis.  His frame of reference in the area of civil
liberties was therefore not, as Eastman’s had been, the internationalist
outlook of the woman’s suffrage movement.  It was instead the domestic
outlook of a reformer involved in causes such as Margaret Sanger’s efforts
to educate Americans about birth control and the NAACP’s efforts to fight
municipal housing segregation.181  To be sure, in his first months with the
Union, Baldwin supported its core internationalist agenda.  And much later
in life, Baldwin would become deeply involved in the United Nations’s
work for international human rights.  “Nations,” he would go on to suggest
in the 1970s, were “downright silly” – imaginary divisions, as Eastman had
suggested sixty years before, of people into “geographical units” bounded
by arbitrary lines and protected by armies.182  But in 1917, as Eastman had
already begun to realize, significant differences of principle over
internationalism increased within the Union upon Baldwin’s arrival.
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For a few months, tensions between Baldwin’s and Eastman’s
theories of civil liberties took a back seat to a larger conflict that drove such
figures as Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg out of the Union altogether.  Wald
and Kellogg had never been convinced that the civil liberties strategy
offered a viable solution to the dilemmas facing the Union once war began.
After the declaration of war, Wald and Kellogg – like Root and Wilson –
believed strongly that the obligations of national citizenship required
support for the prosecution of the war.  The civil liberties campaign
engineered by Baldwin and Eastman, in their view, veered too close to
making the Union “a party of opposition to the government.”  Over the
course of the summer, they struggled to bring the Union around to Wald’s
less confrontational approach.  But by September, Wald, Kellogg, and a
number of others felt that they could not “remain if the active work for Civil
Liberties is continued.”  Eastman and others in the American Union sought
to insist that the Union was not “embarking on a program of political
obstruction” but merely working “against hysterical legislation, and for
peace.”  But the subtleties of the distinction were lost on the disgruntled
Wald-Kellogg wing of the Union.  By October, Wald and Kellogg had
resigned.183
Divergences between Baldwin and Eastman quickly resurfaced
once the split within the Union was complete.  But by the fall of 1917, the
prevailing atmosphere of mandatory patriotism made it virtually impossible
for the Civil Liberties Bureau to advance Eastman’s brand of
internationalism.  After complaints from high-ranking members of the
military, Secretary of War Baker cut off the Bureau’s relations with the War
Department in May 1918.  Three months later, the Department of Justice
raided the Bureau’s offices and seized its papers.184  Courts began
convening grand juries to investigate “foreigners” on soap boxes.185  Max
Eastman was put on trial not once but twice during 1918 for his work on
The Masses (the juries hung both times).186  And Baldwin himself was
arrested for refusal to register for the draft, convicted, and sentenced to one
46 Internationalism & Civil Liberties
187Cottrell, Roger Nash Baldwin, 83-90.
188E.F. Alexander to Roger N. Baldwin, Nov. 1, 1917, reel 4, ACLU Archives; Press Release,
Nov. 7, 1917, reel 4, ACLU Archives.
189“They Who Play with Fire,” Grand Rapids Press, [May 1917], reel 4, ACLU Archives;
“Statement to the New York Tribune by the Civil Liberties Bureau of the American Union Against
Militarism” [Sep. 27, 1917?], folder 2.4, reel 102, Wald Papers.
190Theodore Roosevelt, “Speech at Springfield, Illinois, August 26, 1918,” in Chambers,
Eagle and the Dove, 127; Knock, To End All Wars, 169.
191Elihu Root, “The Conditions and Possibilities Remaining for International Law after the
War,” in Men and Policies: Addresses by Elihu Root 427, 432 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds.,
1925).
192Norman Thomas et al. to Lillian D. Wald, Jan. 19, 1920, Wald Papers.
193Roger N. Baldwin to Lawrence G. Brooks, Sep. 24, 1917, reel 4, ACLU Archives.
194“See Worldwide Anarchist Plot,” New York Times, Dec. 26, 1917.
year in prison.187  Around the country, attitudes toward internationalists
deteriorated still further.  Herbert Bigelow, who had spoken on behalf of the
Union’s Truth About Preparedness Campaign in the spring of 1916 was
kidnaped and brutalized in November 1917.188  The Grand Rapids Press
labeled the Union and allied groups “seditious” and the New York Tribune
classed them as dangerous “enemies within.”189  By August 1918, Theodore
Roosevelt was singling out “internationalists” as playing into the hands of
“German autocracy.”190  “Internationalism,” Elihu Root would soon
announce, had become a threat to “the authority and responsibility of
nations,” of which the United States was one.191
In the face of nationalist coercion, Baldwin led the Civil Liberties
Bureau – now formally divorced from the Union and renamed the National
Civil Liberties Bureau – in what Norman Thomas called “a new direction
for civil liberties.”192  The moral imperatives of nationalism had indelibly
tarred internationalism with the brush of treason.  “Internationalists and
radical peace organizations,” explained Roger Baldwin to one supporter in
September 1917, had come under tremendous pressure to purge “German
names” from their lists of officials.193  Things became all the more dire after
the November 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia.  “Worldwide Anarchist
Plot” screamed headlines linking the “Bolsheviki” to the I.W.W. and to
“revolutionaries” around the world.194  As the prosecutor at the 1918
Espionage Act trial of Eugene Debs put it in his closing argument to the
jury, “pitch all the nations into one pot with the Socialists on top and you’ve
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got internationalism.”195  By 1919, the federal government initiated
deportations of suspected radicals back to Russia.  The infamous Palmer
Raids quickly followed in November of that year, as did the similar Lusk
Committee Raids in New York State after them.196  By December 1919,
Wilson, who had been a willing but unenthusiastic supporter of Burleson’s
and Gregory’s enforcement actions during the war, was calling for a
peacetime extension of the Espionage Act.197  Even Lillian Wald, who had
so carefully extricated herself in the summer of 1917 from the possible
appearance of opposition to the war effort, would find herself still trying to
defend her patriotism some two years later.198
Between Baldwin’s domestic frame of reference and the
extraordinary pressures being exerted against internationalism, it is hardly
a wonder that the National Civil Liberties Bureau began to pull back from
its internationalist beginnings.  The great virtue of the civil liberties
campaign as a war time program was its ostensibly patriotic connections to
the nation’s deepest constitutive traditions.  And with Baldwin’s leadership,
the National Civil Liberties Bureau seized on those traditions to advance a
conception of civil liberties increasingly stripped of internationalist
trappings.  Gone were the appeals to do away with the abstraction of the
nation-state as a political form.  Gone were the calls for civil liberties as
both the necessary precondition for and the purpose of new structures of
international governance.  In their place, Baldwin substituted civil liberties
claims couched in the history of American nationalism.  Affiliates were
urged to celebrate the 130th anniversary of the signing of the U.S.
Constitution in September 1917.199  The Bureau’s challenges to the federal
conscription regime, Baldwin assured, aimed not to obstruct the draft but
merely to ensure that the first draft since the Civil War “should not take
place without the highest authority in the country deciding upon it
squarely.”  And propaganda against the draft would cease, Baldwin
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explained, to be replaced by work narrowly confined to “the lines of legal
defense.”200  “Let us be patriots in the true sense,” exclaimed a Bureau-
affiliated lawyer from Chicago, perfectly capturing the newly-bounded legal
horizons of the Bureau.201  In the Bureau’s devotion to national ideals, a
press release from the fall of 1917 declared, “we believe ourselves to be
patriots, no less sincere and earnest than those who lead our armies to
France.”202  The “cause of civil liberties,” Bureau leaders insisted, was
“loyal” to the “American ideal” of freedom.203  Even Crystal Eastman took
advantage of the prerogatives of patriotism: “there is no more patriotic duty
than to keep democracy alive at home,” she announced.  Democracy, in
turn, meant the protection of “ancient American liberties.”204  By the time
the Bureau held a conference in January 1918, the forceful internationalist
voices of just a year before had become muted.  Rather than talk about the
relationship between civil liberties and international legal institutions,
Baldwin and his colleagues focused on the protection of civil liberties in
war time as a “test of the highest type of loyalty” – loyalty not to global
citizenship or to the idea of world federation, but to self-consciously
national ideals.205
*                            *                           *
Three further conferences in the next year – one still widely
remembered, the others now more or less obscure – made clear the extent
to which the internationalist energies had waned.  1919 had brought
renewed hope to internationalists in the United States and across Europe.
The Paris Peace Conference began in January, with Wilson promoting the
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internationalist idea of a League of Nations.206  At the same time, Jane
Addams and the women’s branch of the internationalist movement
assembled at Zurich in a renewed showing of the radical internationalism
that had characterized the Woman’s Peace Parade at the early stages of the
war.  Eastman did not attend; leaders of the Zurich conference feared that
the scandal of her divorce from Bennie and quick remarriage to Walter
would undermine the respect accorded to the conference.207  And though
many internationalists bitterly opposed the indemnities imposed on
Germany by the Treaty of Versailles that emerged in June, the Treaty
nonetheless provided for what many internationalists had been talking about
for decades: a League of Nations “to promote international cooperation and
to achieve international peace and security.”208 
At the war’s end, the National Civil Liberties Bureau seemed to be
presiding over a similar rebirth of its own internationalism.  In June, as the
Paris Conference wound down, the Bureau proposed an “international
conference for the restoration of civil liberties.”  The conference, to be held
in New York in October, would reach out across international boundaries
to begin the process of reconstituting pre-war internationalist alliances.209
The Bureau arranged to co-sponsor the conference with its British
counterpart, the National Council for Civil Liberties.  Indeed, Eastman and
her husband Walter Fuller, who had moved to London together several
months before, took the lead in organizing the British side of the event.210
Moreover, early signs suggested that the conference would resonate
powerfully with the internationalist tradition.  Arthur Ponsonby of the
English antiwar organization known as the Union for Democratic Control
suggested that the conference might help create the “lasting foundation of
an enlightened and democratic internationalism.”211  B.N. Langdon-Davies
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of the National Council for Civil Liberties similarly assured his American
counterparts that although the conference would focus on Anglo-American
liberties, it would not cut against “the wider internationalism we all seek.”212
Early programs thus suggested that the conference would focus heavily on
such issues as the “International Aspects of Civil Liberty,” and topics like
“Why Freedom Matters – International Cooperation.”213 
In some respects, the conference was a smashing success.  Though
Franklin Giddings, who had become increasingly associated with support
for the war, refused to come, leading figures in American law – Zachariah
Chafee, Jr., Felix Frankfurter, and Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law
School, all of whom were taking up important places in the early history of
civil liberties in American law – came down from Cambridge for the event.
Their prominence and their close connections to men on the Supreme Court
and in the White House meant that support for the protection of civil
liberties had moved from the eclectic margins of radical internationalism
into the corridors of power.214
Yet from the internationalist perspective, the conference failed.
Wilson had struggled mightily since his return from Paris to persuade the
Senate to ratify his internationalist treaty.215  At the Anglo-American
Liberties Conference, too, internationalism foundered on the shoals of
nationalist passions and difficult details.  The conference was full of the
high rhetoric of pre-war internationalism.  Speakers denounced “old
assumptions of sovereignty and national honor” as ideas that “belong to the
Middle Ages.”  “Liberty is not national,” they declared, and called for an
internationalist system that would move beyond the “territorial basis” of the
nation state and beyond the “nationalistic segregation of peoples.”  But in
the new era of the League and the Paris Conference, the platitudes of pre-
war internationalism were no longer sufficient.  Concrete proposals for
international structures were the order of the day.  Yet the extraordinary
complexity of the international question and the impracticality of
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internationalist ideas quickly became apparent.  Those who favored gradual
evolution toward internationalism, for example, clashed with those who
urged immediate internationalist commitments.  Socialists clashed with
liberals.  Proto-nationalists from colonized regions like India and Ireland
insisted on the priority of national independence to international structures,
even as internationalists sought to create trans-national institutions of
authority.  Finding “a formula between nationalism and internationalism,”
as Norman Thomas put it, proved impossible.  By the final day of the
conference, those in attendance were riven with dissension.  The
conference, Thomas warned, was “in danger of being lost in an unnecessary
bog”; debates over internationalism threatened to “wreck” the conference,
cautioned another participant.  And so they did.  Just four weeks after
Wilson’s devastating stroke ensured the demise of the League of Nations
in the U.S. Senate, the last gasp of wartime radical internationalism
collapsed in a mess of differences and recriminations.216
What the assembled participants in the Anglo-American Tradition
of Liberty Conference could agree on was the value of civil liberties.
Within a few months of the close of the conference, Baldwin reorganized
the National Civil Liberties Bureau as the American Civil Liberties Union.
The ACLU would continue to follow international events, including the
demise of the British National Council for Civil Liberties in 1920.  But
almost from the moment of its founding, Baldwin and the ACLU sought to
obscure the organization’s internationalist beginnings.  The Bureau,
Baldwin contended in 1920, had not been an “antiwar organization,” but
rather an organization that “insisted on American constitutional rights.”
And already, the center of attention for civil libertarians had shifted away
from the question of war resistance and opposition to militarism, to the
problem of the “radicals, especially the I.W.W. . . . and the Socialists.”
“Radicalism, not the attitude toward the war,” now seemed to be the
motivating factor in most instances of attacks on civil liberties.  The ACLU
thus organized itself to defend “peaceful picketing” and “trade unionism”
and to fight discrimination against radical and labor meetings.  Just as the
ACLU would later purge communists from its ranks, the early ACLU had
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washed itself clean of its internationalist origins.217  
VI
 
What is striking about the development of a new language of civil
liberties in American law between 1917 and 1920 is that it took part in both
the modernist and the traditional idioms the war had occasioned.  Historians
have long debated the cultural consequences of the great war.  Some hold
that the attempt to make sense of the brutal violence of modern states
touched off a deep shift toward the ironic and the modernist.  Others argue
that the war occasioned a powerful return to traditionalist rhetorics as a
mechanism for coping with the apparent senselessness of the war.  Jay
Winter, for example, has observed that the war revived “a number of
traditional languages” expressed in “unusual and modern forms.”218  
In precisely this way, lawyers like Eastman had responded to the
war and the rise of new totalizing state institutions by reinvigorating the
familiar language of rights and liberties that they had only recently rejected
as a Victorian anachronism.  For Eastman and her colleagues, however, the
turn to rights advanced a strikingly modernist project in international law.
The abstraction of rights seemed to offer a way to contain the dangerous
abstraction of state sovereignty.  Eastman’s internationalist appropriations
of a traditional language of rights and liberties, in other words, were
themselves deeply ironized – they sought to pick and choose among the
totems of a national tradition so as strategically to advance a modern
internationalist agenda, hitting on the abstraction of rights as more useful
(and less dangerous) than the abstraction of sovereignty.  The new civil
liberties movement of the twentieth-century was thus the product of a kind
of double disillusionment with the fixtures of nineteenth-century legal
thought – rights and states.  And yet in the searing heat of war time patriotic
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fervor, internationalist modernism quickly gave way to a more
straightforwardly traditional arguments rooted ever more deeply in the
trappings of American national identity.  The strategy of invoking a
traditionalist language of rights came to overwhelm the internationalist
agenda that language had been marshaled to advance.  And indeed, within
a few short years, Baldwin’s recrafting of the civil liberties movement in the
ACLU would obscure almost completely the movement’s international law
beginnings.
Eastman herself refused to compromise with the imperatives of the
nation state.  As John Haynes Holmes later remembered, Eastman “could
not, or more likely would not, surrender the idealism” that had brought her
to the internationalist cause.219  She therefore never embraced the Bill of
Rights and civil liberties as wholeheartedly as Baldwin had, strategically or
otherwise.  The First Amendment, she wrote from London, had “never”
been “any good in a crisis”; it had “never been proof against a strain.”  And
as labor unions, socialists, and the ACLU turned to civil liberties to advance
their causes, she caustically noted that those safeguards “had never been “of
much practical value in protecting the poorest workers.”  Especially after
U.S. intervention in Russia in 1918, Eastman’s own views had radicalized
dramatically in the direction of support for a Bolshevik strain of
communism that thought it unlikely that “capitalist states” would “maintain
democratic institutions against their own interest.”220  Even in the area of
woman’s rights, where she had worked for legal change since childhood,
she lost hope in the reform possibilities of the law.  Feminism could “most
assuredly” not effect real equality between the sexes by laws; these were
problems “of education, of early training.”  “We must,” she concluded,
“bring up feminist sons.”221
Eastman, it seems, had encountered the limits of lawyering.  In
Eastman’s day, as still in our own, the sovereignty of states was the most
powerful source of the authority of law and of lawyers.  The authority of the
profession she had chosen thus derived from the very sovereign authority
of states that Eastman sought to critique.  Lawyering seemed to have come
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with powerfully counter-revolutionary institutional limits.  Legal
institutions were not immune to change.  Rights claims based in the nation’s
constitutive legal documents, after all, had made available the civil liberties
movement.  Over the succeeding decades, international lawyers would
make halting, painstaking progress in the establishment of international
human rights norms that constrained the sovereignty of nation-states.222  But
legal institutions were also powerfully resistant to the kinds of radical
transformations that Eastman and the radical internationalists had sought to
bring about.  In particular, the authority of the state had resisted incursions
on its jurisdiction.  If for the last century American lawyer-skeptics have
turned to the abstraction of civil liberties, they have done so at least in part
because they have had all too little success in eroding the abstraction of
sovereignty.
